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Abstract
In professional guidelines for palliative sedation in end-of life care, a particular notion
of conscious life experience is associated with specific cognitivist notion of frontal lobe
autonomy. Drawing on Turner and Fauconnier’s work in cognitive linguistics I argue
in this chapter that even our most central notions like human subjectivity and autonomy
are  conceptual  blends.  This  chapter  explores  the  origins  and  emergence  of  these
concepts  and  their  entailments.  It  digs  deep  into  the  conceptual  blending  of  the
ontogenetic development of the individual with the phylogenetic history of life. This
hyper-blend of the flesh is contrasted with the hyper-blend of an irreal, non-material
deep,  inner  space  that  is  co-extensive  with  consciousness  and  with  the  rational,
operative agent constituting the human subject. The last part of the chapter explores the
frictions and problematic entailments of these different hyper-blends for end-of-life care
practices concerning brain death, persistent vegetative state and palliative sedation.
Despite respect for a patient’s autonomy being first among the principles of medical
ethics, cognitivist criteria used in the assessment of a patientâ€™s decision-making
competence reduce and constrain (truncate) the patient’s autonomy in a variety of ways
in one of the situations in life where it should matter most, in dying.
Keywords: cognitivist neocortical autonomy, conceptual blending, end-of-life care
1. Introduction
In this chapter, I will develop the analysis of a problematic that cropped up in my previous work
on the role of palliative sedation in end-of-life care [1, 2]. Namely, the ways in which professio‐
nal guidelines constrain the autonomy of patients in one of the situations where it matters most,
that is in the process of dying. End-of-life care is an important object of governance. In the
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governance of end-of-life care, there are two ‘objects of concern’. One is to protect the autono‐
my and integrity of the dying patient. The other is to maintain public trust in the institution of
modern medicine and professional health care. The two are related of course. To maintain public
trust in professional health care, constraints are imposed on what assistance-in-dying you can
ask for, what will be offered to you or granted when you ask for it. Respect for the patient’s
autonomy ranks highest among the principles of medical ethics [3]. Yet, when it comes to dying,
the patient’s right to self-determination is constrained by professional judgment and the health-
care professional’s right to conscience. A fine line runs between allowing to die and hastening
the patient’s death. The boundary between the two is diligently monitored and protected. It is
a borderland between the prevention and prosecution of illegal, criminal killing and compas‐
sionate care, which does not stop when lives can no longer be saved or prolonged. I was struck
by the central importance of a notion of ‘conscious life experience’ in the arguments against a
more generous availability of palliative sedation in end-of-life care and by a related operation‐
alization of informed consent in terms of higher, neocortical functions of information process‐
ing and decision-making. The respect for a particular form of neocortical autonomy and the almost
unbounded respect for the sanctity of life form an unbreakable couple, culminating in the
paramount centrality of consciousness in professional guidelines for palliative sedation. It is in
a sense peculiar that these principles should stand so strong in end-of-life situations when disease
processes erode the capacity for integrated functioning of the brain and body and when death
is near. Is it because we cannot let go when it is time?
2. Conceptual blending
To make an inroad into this problematic I will start from the pre-position that all judgments
about the world, about human nature and core human values are the products of cognitive
processes embedded in the bodies, brains and activities of individuals and the interactions
among and practices of members of collectives. I will pursue an analysis that draws on recent
work in cognitive linguistics. More specifically, I will draw on theories of conceptual blending
or conceptual integration in meaning construction as advanced by Fauconnier [4–6] and Turner
[6–8]. Conceptual blending theorists do not distinguish between the blending that occurs on
the fly in everyday meaning construction through language and dialog [9] and scientific
theories and philosophical models [6, 7]. All forms of scientific thought and reasoning can be
subsumed under the banner of human cognition, to which perspectives, theories and concepts
of embodied and distributed cognitive science may be fruitfully applied. Following Turner we
could argue that every theoretical concept is a hyperblend, including the notions that interests
us most, namely the notions of human agency and autonomy, recognizing them—in the
polysemic meanings of both knowing and acknowledging—as products of contingent, funda‐
mentally biological and social cognitive processes.
Let me first explain conceptual blending by example. We usually think of how old we are in
terms of chronological age (CA). Measured in years and months, CA measures the time elapsed
since we were born. Always living in the present, CA is a point moving along the arrow of
time, neither turning back on itself nor speeding up into the future. Biologists of aging have
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introduced the concept of biological age (BA) and search for ways to measure it [10]. In a
normalized population, they have measured different sets of features of the body (biomarkers)
and how they change with age. Based on these population data, they have construed an
alternative aging scale to which an individual’s values can be compared. Derived mathematical
algorithms are used to calculate the age with which these individual values correlate. In
forensic science, such scales based on, for example, development features of the skeleton and
dentition are used to estimate the chronological age of a person or body for which that
information is missing or disputed. In public health practices, this computed BA is compared
(blended) with your chronological age, as a result of which you may be 28-year-old with the
body of a 65-year-old. The average life expectancy that has been calculated (blended and
compressed) for the men or women who were born around the same time as you were, has
turned your lifespan into a limited amount of time that you have been using up at an acceler‐
ated speed; destined for a premature death? [11] The good news is that BA, contrary to CA, is
reversible. The modifiable risk factors that have been entered into the etiological model explain‐
ing the discrepancy between an individual’s CA and BA are within the range of the individual
to do something about. By implication, personal health risk management is the individual’s
responsibility.
Conceptual integration can be schematically presented by the way of a minimal network that
comprises at least three mental spaces: at least two input mental spaces and the blending space
[8]. The input spaces selectively contribute or project structure and elements to the blended
space in which these are integrated. Structure and elements that occupy analogous positions
in the two input spaces, which in other words map between domains, may be compressed into
identity and human scale. The individual in the CA blend is identical to the individual in the
CA blend. However, there may also be vital disanalogies in the blended space: the discrepancy
between CA and BA. Following its initial integration structure and elements in the blend can
be elaborated, as a result of which new structure and meaning emerges that was not initially
available from the input spaces: premature death, the idea that you might die ahead of your
time, earlier than necessary. In this example, the blended space presents a trajectory of life that
is counterfactual compared to the one on which you now are going: a trajectory in which it is
possible for you as an individual to reach the average life expectancy of your cohort. This
trajectory will remain counterfactual unless you take care and take responsibility for your own
health. The point is not that the blend is a ‘possible world’ or a true representation of the world,
but that the blend suggests alternative ways of engaging with the world, and whose primary
responsibility that is.
Conceptual integration performs work on its previously entrenched products. New blends are
made out of inputs that already are blends. That is, in its advance forms, conceptual integration
makes blends of blends. Turner calls these “blends of blends”… hyper-blends. “A hyper-blend
is a blend that has at least one of its input mental spaces something that is already a blend.
Hyper-blends occur routinely” [8].
Models of cause-effect relationships are an important type of blend that enters into hyper‐
blends that are more complex. In human scale situations, we may observe events in close
spatiotemporal proximity and construe one as the cause of the other. In many situations,
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however, we only have records of what we take to be effects and try to learn about causes
(antecedents) by making inferences from these preserved results (consequences). However,
we are particular about what we allow to take the role of a cause. We usually do not allow
events that occur after what we take to be an effect to act as a cause. However, we do allow
the passage of time to be the cause of death when we say that a person ‘died of old age’. We
allow features, actions and events that did not happen (counterfactuals) to play the role of
contributing causes when we say that an omission of or failure to install a preventative measure
causes a disease. We allow private and immaterial human intentions to have effects in the
material world or infer unobservable (and difficult to prove) private intentions from recorded
effects in the material world. Through blending, we routinely amalgamate the physical and
mental, material and immaterial, factual and counterfactual, and is and ought. We blend to
create meaning, shape and understand the world we live in.
3. Living in the blend
A theory of conceptual blending is, however, not just a handy tool for conceptual analysis. As
a ‘space of representation’ [12, 13], the blended space envelops, in addition to concepts and
logical structure, also data that are produced under the blend’s specific epistemic conditions
or selectively projected or appropriated into the blend to provide empirical support or
foundation. “Of course”, Fauconnier [5] writes, “observation and theory are part of the same
overall package; a ‘phenomenon’ requires a theory, even if it is a folk theory, in order to be
observed at all. There is no absolute, direct theory-independent observational interpretation
of the ‘facts’. As a science evolves, there is simultaneous, parallel evolution of the observational
procedures and interpretations, and of the explanatory theory itself”. Furthermore, conceptual
structure, framing logic and produced data are blended with ontoepistemological positions.
When blended with a realist or essentialist epistemology, theoretical concepts that were
introduced to help order and make sense of disparate data or events reify into real-world
processes. Inferred causes are assumed to exist in the world, past or present, and exert their
forming power on recordable effects. Human rights and values are assumed to derive from
the essential nature of human beings and cannot be alienated from or denied beings who
belong to that category. Theoretical notions, produced data and epistemological position thus
form, when mutually supportive, a robust package, a mode of ordering to use Mol and Law’s
term [14]. As temporarily stabilized formations, ‘modes of ordering’, or hyperblends, do not
only construe but also represent worlds. Erasing the faint line between epistemology and
ontology, one could say that it (the hyperblend) is the world. For scientists, or philosophers,
or practitioners with a ‘high inclusion in the frame’ [15], the set of claims that make up an
advanced hyperblend lies too close to the core of their deeply assimilated and largely uncon‐
scious beliefs to be challenged, or even overtly recognized as something potentially disputable.
They live in the blend. There is recursivity here. Collectively and over time, we construe worlds
– through cognitive processes of hyperblending concepts, data and epistemology – and then
live in them. However, ‘from time to time’, Rheinberger [13] writes, “new forms emerge that
have something significant about them, something that catalyzes previously present actors,
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things, institutions into a new mode of existence, a new assemblage, an assemblage that not
only puts things in a different light, but makes them work in a different manner”.
The power a particular hyperblend can hold over people, fueling its own protection and the
rejection of alternatives, should not be underestimated. Apparently, this is the case when
deeply engrained beliefs about our own human nature are challenged; about what sets us apart
from animals; about what is our essence at the end, when our existence as an individual human
being is imminent and about what remains after our body has eroded and disintegrated. But
neither should the importance be underestimated of recognizing the contingency, multiplicity,
diversity and simultaneous coexistence of different modes of ordering life and the world, and
how they relate to and interfere with each other. “For”, Mol and Law [14] argue, “the various
modes of ordering, logics, styles, practices, and the realities they perform do not exist in
isolation from one another … They are not islands unto themselves, closed cultures, self-
contained paradigms, or bubbles. [T]hey interfere with one another and reveal … partial
connections”. ‘Often’, Mol and Law [14] continue, “it is not so much a matter of living in a
single mode of ordering or of ‘choosing’ between them. Rather it is that we find ourselves at
places where these modes join together. Somewhere in the interferences something crucial
happens … complexity is created, emerging where various modes of ordering (styles, logics)
come together and add up comfortably or in tension, or both”. The history of the sciences,
philosophies and ethics is a history of diversification of modes of ordering, not of the successive
replacement of one by the other. It is a history of contended claims about the appropriateness
of hyperblends and their entailments.
Blending helps us to compress to human scale and handle, to use Turner’s favorite phrase,
“vast ideas that span great ranges of time, space, causation and agency, ideas that are not at
all restricted to the local scene” [8]. The blended space does not replace the spaces from which
it received inputs. In a methodological sense, this implies that the input spaces are accessible
and amenable for analysis through the blend. However, there is also a diachronic, historical
dimension to hyperblends. Powerful hyperblends have evolved over time and can be traced
in the history of the sciences and of ideas. To trace the evolution of modern notions of human
subjectivity and autonomy we must engage with the history of ideas about the relationship
between the development of an individual and the history of life.
4. Blending development of an individual with the history of life
A fault line roughly separates the hyperblends that concern us here, comprising key notions
about human nature, consciousness and autonomy. On the one hand we find blends that
feature a deity, or other supranatural being, as the creator and giver of life (creationism,
intelligent design). On the other hand, we have views of life advanced by sciences that do not
allow as causes, entities or processes that are not part of the natural world [16]. Neither do they
allow outcomes that emerge temporally after their antecedents (no teleological explanations
allowed). I recognize the importance of a spiritual dimension in palliative care and the strength
many people derive in dying from their belief in a higher being and an afterlife. However, I
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am primarily interested in the power and centrality of an idea of conscious life experience that
overrules a person’s own direction over the process of dying in a secular, nonreligious context.
Therefore, I will leave the former aside and pursue the latter. This hyperblend or view of
human life is grafted on a compression into unity of the development of an individual organism
and the history of life on earth. On a human scale, we experience individuality as the membrane
or skin bound discreteness and uniqueness of organisms. In human reproduction, animal
husbandry and plant breeding we experience the birth, growth and decline of individual
organisms on a time scale for which the duration of a human life provides the standard.
Endeavors to understand the nature of the history of life on earth, stretching back into deep
time measured on a geological timescale and utterly inaccessible for present day biologists,
have not only received inputs from the study of fossil records [17], but also from the compa‐
rative anatomy of now-living species and from embryology. Especially the latter, the idea the
one can learn about the history of life from the comparative study of the morphology of
embryological development across species has contributed strongly to the blending of
ontogeny and phylogeny [18]. Recognizing that all species that rely on sexual reproduction
for their procreation pass through a single-cell stage, this fertilized egg maps as the origin of
an individual organism onto the origin of life. The ‘unfolding’ of the individual organism
through fetal growth, birth and postnatal maturation maps onto the ‘unfolding’ (evolution) of
life from its humble unicellular origins through higher levels of complexity and perfection in
the arrival of man. The themes of differentiation, specialization and maturation of cell lineages
and tissues in developing individual embryos map onto the diversification of life forms
through speciation and the emergence of excellence in the branching tree of life.
This blend has not only inspired an ‘iconography of an expectation’ [19], which is the more-
than-familiar present day cartoons that represent the evolution of man as a linear march of
progress but also inspired the nineteenth century biologist Ernst Haeckel’s biogenetic law,
better known as the notion of ‘recapitulation’: the idea that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny
and that embryos during their individual growth and development pass through the adult
forms of its ancestors. In Haeckel’s view, evolution occurred through the heritable addition of
new features to the adult form of ancestors [18]. In other words, “we climb our evolutionary
tree in the womb” [20]. Haeckel published a famous plate showing a series of embryos, each
aborted in its own development, in a grid along two dimensions: an ontogenetic series
comparing stages of an individual’s development and an evolutionary series comparing
different species. In Haeckel’s ‘space of representation’, in his blend, individual organisms
deliberately selected and ordered in a two-dimensional series came to express as new and
emergent features in the blend namely development and evolution, history and progress.
“Development”, Hopwood [20] argues, “is thus not simply the process embryologists study;
it is also an effect they have labored to produce”. Haeckel’s plates gave embryos presented as
developmental series a public profile [20]. The idea of ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny
endured far into the twentieth century and exerted its influence long after it had fallen from
grace and had lost credibility among professional evolutionary biologists [18].
The hyperblend of individual development with the history of life, characterized by directed
evolution towards an expected arrival of man at the pinnacle, has been challenged by alter‐
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native blends. Darwin displaced the idea that the ‘unfolding’ of an intrinsic essence was the
primary, causal force driving evolution in the history of life. He replaced it with the idea of
natural selection, itself a blend with input from artificial selection as experienced on a human
scale in animal husbandry and plant breeding, Natural selection works on undirected,
isometric variation (equal likelihood in all directions) in a population. Gould [21] points out
that for Darwin natural selection was not just an external negative force weeding out the
misfits, but that it was a creative, positive force in and cause of evolution working gradually
over vast expanses of time. For Darwin, natural selection worked on the level of organisms
struggling for survival. In the twentieth century, Stephen Jay Gould, with Niles Eldredge,
worked to recast, through their theory of punctuated equilibrium, the history of life as “a story
of massive removal [large extinctions] followed by differentiation within a few surviving
stocks” [19]. Gould also worked to expand Darwinian evolutionary theory into a hierarchical
theory, allowing natural selection to operate, above the organismal level, on the level of species.
In a section called ‘The Grand Analogy’ in The Structure of Evolutionary Theory [21], Gould
engages in an extensive and explicit blending operation. Gould maps individual organisms as
the units of selection in microevolution to species as the units of selection in macroevolution.
He maps the birth and death of individual organisms to the origin and extinction of species.
He maps the timescale of the life of an individual to the scale of geological time; the parent–
child relationship of organisms to parental and daughter species, the transmission of features
from parental generations to offspring to the transmission of formative properties between
ancestral and descendant species. Macroevolutionary trends “could be conceptualized as a
result of higher order selection upon a pool of speciational events that might occur at random
with respect to the direction of the trend. In such a case, the role of species in a trend would
become directly comparable with the classical status of organisms as units of change within a
population under natural selection” [21]. In this blend, the history of life is not a linear march
of progress towards an expected outcome (the arrival of man), but a story that blends ontogeny
and phylogeny in a different way.
5. Heterochrony in human development and the brain
Thus far, ontogeny seems to have provided a conceptual structure to phylogeny, the human
scale experiences and observations of discrete organisms serving as the source domain of
metaphorical projection of structure to the target domain: the utterly inaccessible domain of
the history of life. However, Turner [8] emphasizes how structure from the blended space can
be projected back to the input spaces. Despite disagreements and controversies among
evolutionary biologists about the precise nature, relative frequency and importance of
formative, causal processes, the conceptual blends achieved have recast the human species as
a species among other species with whom it shares common ancestors. Humans share with
other vertebrates the same fundamental ‘building plan’. Humans share the basic structure of
their brains with other mammals. Our brains are mammalian brains.
It is in our ‘expanded’ brains, and the ‘higher’ cognitive functions that they afford, that many
scientists and philosophers locate the features through which the human species bootstrapped
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itself out of the world of brute animals. Yes, we belong to the animal kingdom, we share
ancestors with our companion species, but we also stand above and at a distance from them.
Exactly what those features are and what brought them about is a matter of contention.
Today, there seems to be little support among evolutionary biologists for the idea that the
expansion of the human brain can be accounted for by the accumulation of mutations in
structural genes, that is, in genes that code for proteins. The number of structural genes in the
human genome does not far exceed that in other primates. In other words, the differences in
genotype are insufficient to account for the marked differences in phenotype. However, in
recent years, more emphasis has been put on the regulation of gene expression – both on genes
regulating the expression of other genes and molecular non-DNA processes involving histones
– the proteins around which strands of DNA are winded to form chromosomes. Interestingly,
echoing this shift in emphasis, Gould [18] argues for the relative frequency and factuality (sic!)
of heritable changes in the rate of ontogenetic development to account for macroevolutionary
trends on the level of species. These changes in the rate of development may be different for
different parts of the body and affect developmental processes like teething and the onset of
sexual maturation differently.
This ‘heterochrony’ in ontogenetic development is, when we think about it, a familiar feature.
We know from embryology that the cranial parts of the embryo, encompassing the brain,
develop and grow faster than its caudal parts. We can observe this feature in common
ultrasound images of first-trimester pregnancies. Even at birth the baby’s ‘hind-limbs’ are
relatively undeveloped compared to its head, making the newborn infant dependent on
maternal and parental care for a long time after birth. The caudal parts of the body catch up
during childhood, developing and growing into long and strong legs before the onset of sexual
maturation blocks further growth. Contrary to what one might expect, the evolution of the
human species and its expanded brain is not the result of a speeding up but rather of a slowing
down of developmental processes: retardation. This change in the rate of development delays
the onset of processes that constrain further growth, allowing for longer growth periods. The
slower rate of development and maturation also correlates with a longer lifespan. This
relationship seems to hold for the multicellular organism, as well as for the differentiated cell
types within the organisms. Slowly maturing nerve cells are the longest living cells of the
human body. Fast developing red blood cells, which even discard their nucleus before entering
the peripheral blood stream, are among the cells with the shortest lifespan. In humans,
newborn infants maintain a fetal growth rate after birth for about a year, much longer than
other newborn primates do. Compared with other species humans enjoy the longest juvenile
periods before sexual maturation sets in Ref. [18]. The reduced rate of development allows the
brain to grow longer and extend its patterns of cell proliferation in time. As a result, humans
achieve a markedly higher degree of encephalization. The delay in development also delays
the loss of plasticity that is correlated with maturation.
Compared with other species, humans retain for a longer period of time the capacity to form
new neuronal connections and to modify existing ones. Jacobson [22] argues that “this
reduction [of plasticity] occurs at different times in different classes of neurons, so that those
which are generated late in ontogeny and those which mature slowly have the greatest degree
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of modifiability in the mature animal”. The long drawn-out growth period, the prolongation
of childhood and the retainment into adulthood of neural plasticity under conditions of
parental care and instruction, supported by the faculties of memory and language, make
‘human’ a learning rather than an instinctive animal [18]. It is the embodied activity of the
living organism that shapes the pattern of synaptic connections and their firing properties.
Hebb [23] argued that “What fires together wires together!”; the principle of what has become
known as ‘Hebbian learning’ that underlies the formation and reformation of neural cell
assemblies. Explicitly using Burnet’s clonal selection theory of the immune response as an
input to the blend, Edelman [24–26] developed a theory of neural group selection to account
for the ways in which the pattern of neural connections is shaped through ‘differential
amplification’ in recursive reentrant systems by the activities and experience of the living
organism, not by prior programming.
6. Hyperblend of the flesh: self-building brains in evolutionary history and
individuals
The ontogeny/phylogeny blend is extended into the morphology of the brain and further
blended with inputs from new domains, from the study of consciousness and cognition. This
blending process is characterized by a progressive reduction or truncation of the notion of
cognition.
Embodied cognition biologists argue that cognition is a fundamental feature of biological life
[27–29]. Cognition is coextensive with the recursive sensorimotor loops of the embodied
activity of living organisms. In this blend: life = embodied action = cognition. Cognition is a
function that emerges with the formation of a living organism. Cognition is not a feature that
is confined to the emergence in human brains of self-consciousness. The basic story goes like
this. With the formation of a membrane, that envelops an intracellular space and separates it
from a now-external environment, any living organism must maintain its functional integri‐
ty and organization (homeostasis) in interaction with changes in its environment. This is a
recursive relationship. Devices in the membranes (receptors) allow the organism to sense
changes in its environment. Internal, or external but membrane bound motor devices (cilia,
flagella) allow it to respond to these changes. The repeated, recursive cycles of action and
perception constitute an intentional arc. In other words, intentionality conceived as an
organism’s orientedness towards its environment is a property emergent from the forma‐
tion of a membrane. Multicellular organisms developed specialized cells and structures for
these sensory and motor functions. Only organisms that live free and mobile in their envi‐
ronment have developed a nervous system. A central nervous system and brain developed
from the gathering at one side of the body (encephalization) of specialized neurons monitor‐
ing and regulating changing conditions inside the body (giving rise to emotions), in close
association with sense organs and neurons monitoring changes in the environment. At some
point in this evolutionary history, consciousness emerges, at first in prototypical forms that
also other animals may have, then blooming into a fully-fledged autobiographical human self-
consciousness.
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Exactly how body/brains make minds and selves, let alone why, is still a matter of contention.
There is dispute with regard to the how and when they emerged in the history of life. There
are many theories trying to grasp how brains make mind and usually a single self in the
individual body. Nevertheless, the tentative answers to these elusive questions, including the
hierarchical relationship that is assumed to exist between humans and animals, between
reason and emotions, have been blended with the morphology of the brain. In ascending order,
the brainstem encompasses the neural centers that regulate respiration, circulation and
temperature. These are the ‘vegetative’ functions that have to do with the internal conditions
of the body. The midbrain is associated with basic positive emotions like care and joy, and
with negative emotions like fear and anger [30]. Although brainstem and midbrain emerge
during organogenesis in the first trimester of pregnancy, together with the cerebral hemi‐
spheres, in a phylogenetic sense they are considered to be the oldest parts of the brain that we
share with animals. The two hemispheres with their outer rim, the cortex, are considered to
be phylogenetically younger and newer, hence neocortex. In addition to visual and motor
cortices, that must be assumed we also share with other species, it is here in the neocortex we
locate the functions that make us distinctly human: the areas for language perception and
language generation, for abstract thinking and reasoning, for imagining alternative counter‐
factual scenarios and evaluating possible outcomes, yes, for conceptual blending in all its
various forms. Especially the frontal lobes, above our eye sockets, stand out as the locus of the
most advanced, executive higher brain functions. These functions are not only higher in the
sense of more advanced then vegetative functions or emotional functions. They are also
phylogenetically higher because they make us distinctly human.
The macroanatomical structure of the individual brain has by evolutionary neuroscientists
been overlain (blended) with the emergence through evolutionary time of what Damasio calls
a protoself or protoconsciousness, a core self-and-consciousness and the fully-fledged human
autobiographical selfconsciousness [31–34]. Autobiographical consciousness is the defining
feature of what makes us living human beings. It is called autobiographical because it locates
the current self in a temporal continuum of a lived past (memory functions) and an anticipated
but open future (functions of planning and evaluation of alternative courses of action) [34]. All
this miraculous mental and conscious activity, including the sense of unity and continuity over
time of an autonomous Self is, in one way or the other, the result of ongoing dynamic biological
processes in here-and-now brains in continuous interaction with the body in which it is
embedded and of the body’s physical and social environment. In this hyper-blend of the flesh,
the Self is ‘a perpetually recreated neurobiological state’ [31].
7. Hyperblend of the immaterial, autonomous, human subject
The modern notion of the autonomous human subject has received inputs from several distinct
domains. Rose [35] argues that “the sense of ourselves as “psychological” individuals devel‐
oped across the twentieth century … we came to understand and act upon ourselves as beings
inhabited by a deep internal space shaped by biography and experience, the source of our
individuality and the locus of our discontents”. We locate psychology’s deep internal space
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intuitively inside our skull – above and behind your eye sockets, the space occupied by your
frontal lobes? We know from elementary human anatomy that it is the brain that occupies the
skull. There is no empty space there. Yet, this deep internal space is the seat of the self-
governing subject. This concept underlies the important humanist notion of personhood and
human agency. This line of thinking has a long and august pedigree that can be traced back
to John Locke and his contemporaries. In his Essay on Human Understanding, Locke defines a
‘person’ as ‘a thinking, intelligent Being’, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it
self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places” [36]. We conceive of the
deep, internal, private space of the individual mind as being coextensive with consciousness
and with the operative agent doing the intending, willing, emoting, conceptualizing and
associating of concepts to language that we associate with thinking. It is the thinking that we
do in this internal space, and of which we are consciously aware, that we have come to define
– in the sense of delineate – as human cognition. In the same vain, it is the intentions of which
we become consciously aware that we have come to define as human intentionality.
Input to the hyper-blend of the immaterial human subject has also come from a research
program in cognitive science that emerged in the 1940s. This program received inputs from
mathematical logic, general systems theory, Shannon’s statistical information theory of signals
and communication channels, and not in the least, from the invention of information-proc‐
essing machines such as digital computers. An important entailment of this program was that
cognition, conceptualized as information processing, storage and retrieval, was platform
independent: it had been instantiated by Nature in the biological tissues of the brain, but it could
also be instantiated by engineers in artificial silicon-based devices. Like the operation of
software, cognition was independent of the hard ware on which it ran. Again, conceptual
structure and logic was projected back from the blended space to the input space of human
cognition. This blend drove a wedge between human cognition and the human body/brain. It
displaced the body and disembodied cognition. It also displaced emotions as a form of
cognition, that is, as the human body’s principal biological valuation system. However, it
embraced technologies that now became ‘intelligent’ and ‘smart’. Despite the criticism that has
been leveled by embodied cognition theorists [27–29] against this ‘cognitivist’ program, it has
been extremely influential in cognitive science and theories of learning.
As a third input to the blend, Woods [36] argues that the now-commonplace notion of the
autonomous self has evolved out of a backdrop of rebellion against traditional sources of
authority such as the church and state. ‘The contemporary concept of the ‘self’ and ‘person’,
Woods argues, ‘is bound up with a politics of non-interference into the personal life of the
individual…’ [36]. Autonomy as a right to non-interference is firmly embedded in the now-
stronger than ever requirement of informed consent in medical practice and research. In
informed consent procedures, cognition is operationalized in ‘cognitivist’ terms as information
processing. Based on valid information provided by health-care professionals the patient
weighs, evaluates, judges and makes a decision of consent or approval concerning the medical
procedures that are proposed being done to her. The information provided being understood
is a prerequisite for the consent to be valid. In other words, the validity of the consent is a
function of the information provided. I have called the notion of autonomy embedded in and
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performed through these informed consent procedures for neocortical autonomy [2]. Perhaps
frontal lobe autonomy is a better term. Both terms express the blendedness of this highly cognitivist
concept of autonomy with the parts of the brains anatomy on which it is projected.
8. The irreality of the human Self: partial relations, frictions and
problematic entailments
Thinking about psychology’s deep internal space, in which we locate a cognitivist Self that is
the source of motives, intentions and the ability to choose to do what is right – which defines
us as moral agents -, I have struggled to find a term to characterize a space that is real in one
blend but does not exist in another. How can the human subject, devoid of any form of
materialness, exist in human anatomy with its hierarchical spatialization of the brain that is
grafted on ideas about the species’ phylogenetic history? For want of a better word, I have
called it an irreal space to indicate that it is the result on an imaginative act of conceptual
blending [2]. The modern notion of the human autonomous subject (Self) may also be charac‐
terized as irreal: to express the ambiguousness in two senses in which we think about ourselves:
(1) the sense that we are coextensive with our body, with the entailment that the ‘I’ or ‘Self’
ends with the disintegration of the body/brain, and (2) the sense that there is some-thing more,
an immaterial entity (soul?) that we perhaps hope will live on after death. I do not want to
define the two blends as two essentially distinct and separate ontological domains, Descartes’
res extensa and res cogitans. I want to stress the complex ways in which they are related. As Mol
and Law put it, ‘If there are different modes of ordering that coexist, what is reduced or effaced
in one may be crucial in another so that the question no longer is, Do we simplify or do we
accept complexity? It becomes instead a matter of determining which simplification or
simplifications we will attend to and create and, as we do this, of attending to what they
foreground and draw our attention to, as well as what they relegate to the background’ [14].
In everyday life, we routinely, and apparently without too much trouble, amalgamate the
immaterial mind with the flesh inside our skull. The lack of trouble, I suggest, is a result of our
ability to move between and inhabit them both, depending on the discursive requirements of
the situation. Alternating between them helps us to avoid the complexities associated with the
places where the different modes of ordering (hyperblends) join together and interfere.
However, to use another of Turner’s [8] favorite expressions, we are not fooled. We know that
consciousness is dependent on the functional integrity of the biological processes of the brain;
that lack of oxygen (syncope; ventricular fibrillation), or glucose (diabetic hypoglycemia and
coma), the loss of coordination of neural firing (epileptic insult) or the inhibition of certain
neurotransmitters (anesthesia), very quickly makes us loose consciousness. The reversibility
of these conditions, with the phenomenological reappearance of a sense of Self, suggests
continuity of the Self even during the period of unconsciousness: an effect that we labor to
produce. We also know that psychoactive drugs can provoke hallucinations or modify the
quality of our mental state: an effect that we, when positive, may seek or use therapeutically
in an attempt to treat or rebalance mental disturbances. However, the frictions between the
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two hyper-blends become inevitable in end-of-life care situations, when the ‘brilliant fire of
consciousness’ [24] is in danger of being extinguished permanently and irreversible.
In the 1950s, when the new resuscitation techniques of external closed-chest compressions in
combination with mouth-to-mouth ventilation left the hospital and were taught to lay people,
the greater sensitivity of the neocortex to lack of oxygen – compared to midbrain and brain
stem structures – produced a new form. In some cases resuscitation efforts did succeed in
restoring spontaneous heart action and respiration, the regulatory centers of which are located
in the brain stem. However, in the same patients the restoration to animated conscious life failed.
These patients survived an episode of cardiac arrest, but they remained severely brain
damaged: dead brains in bodies with hearts again beating. French physicians coined the term
coma dépassé to describe the state. Today the condition is known as persistent vegetative state
(PVS). With the widespread use of external cardiac massage and mouth-to-mouth breathing,
supplemented with closed-chest defibrillation and supportive drug therapy, their numbers
increased during the 1960s and the 1970s. Their undeniable presence triggered a reformulation
of the concept, criteria and diagnostics of human death in terms of brain death [37, 38]. Defini‐
tions of neocortical death have been proposed, attributing central importance to the irreversible
loss of higher brain functions [39, 40]. For these functions, a viable, phylogenetically younger,
cerebral neocortex was identified as a necessary, albeit not sufficient conditio sine qua non.
Proponents of a neocortical definition of death took great care to emphasize that the work of
redefining death served to clarify the real o ntological status (sic!) of severely brain damaged
patients in intensive care arrangements. The distinction between the body that has developed
or retained the capacity for higher brain functions - the body that is an embodied person -, and
the body that has irreversibly lost this capacity - the body that is a biological remnant after the
person has died-, is not, so they argued, a value-based or moral divide. Yet, neocortical
definitions of death have not been translated and embedded into law.
As the question of the status of severely brain damaged patients in intensive care units
became more urgent as the need for good quality donor organs increased, most countries
settled on a more conservative whole brain definition of death that requires that all nerve cells
within the skull must be shown to be irreversibly damaged. Only after demonstrating that
there has been no blood flow through the brain for 20 min or more can the patient be
pronounced dead and organs extirpated. Practices preceded their legal regulation. In the
Netherlands, a provisional legal basis for the extirpation of healthy organs for transplanta‐
tion purposes was found in the Law on the Disposal of the Dead. As an input to the new
emerging hyperblend of brain death, it was the analogy between autopsy and partial
dissection on one hand, and the extirpation of health organs for transplantation purposes on
the other, which provided in 1971 the initial legal justification for the latter. The Dutch
legislator spent 20 years, and a series of Health Council reports, negotiating public confi‐
dence in the new brain-related definition of death before eventually formalizing the new
hyperblend in the 1991 bill on the Donation of Organs [38].
Today, PVS-patients still have the ontological status of being alive and deserving of the
protection of the law, despite the absence of consciousness. Whereas a stable new hyperblend,
or mode of ordering, has emerged around potential heart-beating organ donors with dead
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brains, matters are quite different for people still in possession of a fully fledged autobio‐
graphical consciousness who wish to maintain control and a certain degree of self-direction
over the time and manner of their death. With a few exceptions, physician-assisted suicide and
euthanasia are illegal in most countries. Even national and professional guidelines that aim to
regulate the use of palliative sedation for terminal, dying patients are quite restrictive. Criteria
for this pharmacological reduction of consciousness in dying patients include intense and
sustained suffering from physical symptoms that have been shown to be refractory to ordinary
treatment. Arguing on the one hand that palliative sedation should be considered to belong
to the repertoire of ordinary and legal medical treatments, these guidelines clearly mark,
through restrictive safeguards, their distance from illegal practices of assisted suicide and
euthanasia [1, 2].
Despite the status of respect for a patient’s autonomy as the first among the four principles of
medical ethics [3], in texts of law, professional guidelines and codes of ethics, it is the much
more restrictive cognitivist, frontal lobe notion of the human subject that has been inscribed.
One problematic entailment of this is that it seems as if patients, in the face of death, cannot
be trusted to know their own mind. The competence to make end-of-life decisions has been
formally delegated and assigned to physicians, reducing the patient’s autonomy into a right
to be heard. Respect for the patient’s autonomy has been made conditional upon health-care
professionals assessment of a patient’s cognitive capacity to give informed consent, applying
criteria derived from the same truncated cognitivist frontal lobe notion of human subjectivity
and personhood. In practice, critically ill and dying patients in health-care settings are often
dependent on the generosity of physicians and other health-care professionals. That is, they
depend on health-care professionals’ understanding of legal regulations and guidelines in
combination with their own understanding of the discretionary space and leeway that their
professional autonomy grants them.
9. Conclusion: autonomy truncated three ways
There is no lack of modern states’ desire to govern practices of end-of-life care. There is no lack
of intervention in and interference with the hardest thing we all must do, dying. This is also
the hardest but perhaps most important thing we ever have to do for our partners in life or for
parents, that is to assist them in dying [1]. Although first among the principles of medical
ethics, the modern notion of the autonomous subject is truncated in at least three different
ways. First, exercising autonomy through the direction of the manner of one’s death is
constrained by the right to conscientious objection of health-care professionals. This right is
rooted in the same principle of autonomy as the patient’s right to self-determination and
noninterference that is inscribed in the international declaration of human rights. As a patient
“You have and absolute autonomous right to determine what happens to you … Unless you
don’t!” [41].
Second, this style of thought reduces the human person to the cognitive capacities and higher
brain functions of the bark (neocortex) of the frontal lobes. It ignores the massive recursive
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connections and interactions throughout life between the neocortex and the deeper, midline
structures of the emotional brain and the body that are being gradually elucidated by neuro‐
science [30, 32]. Natural sciences are often accused of reducing the whole person to molecular-
genetic and neurophysiological events in the body and brain. In this cognitive, neocortical
version of autonomy and personhood, we may recognize a kind of reversed reductionism. This
is not to say that neurosciences shall have the last word, but it may be important, as Rose and
Abi-Rached [42] argue, to critically explore the implications of the new sciences of the brain
for the human and social sciences.
Third, cognitivist notions of an atomistic, modern autonomous subject displace relations and
interactions with other beings as processes that are constitutive of human agency. There is no
lack of recognition of the importance of social relations and the ability to communicate, even
to the extent that this is the capability that makes us truly human. However, the atomistic,
individualized person and human subject located in psychology’s deep internal, but irreal
space gains priority. Social relations and communication come in the second place. The
neocortical Self overrules any other conception of humanness. As the governor that controls
the city, its stronghold and inner citadel (conscious life experience) must be protected at all
costs, even – or perhaps especially – in the face of death. Simultaneously and recursively, by
protecting this idea of the autonomous subject in the patient, health-care professionals and the
law makers who hold the medical professions in high regard maintain the ethical high-ground
of moral accountability.
However, we may invert these arguments and offer an alternative hyperblend for considera‐
tion. We can argue that human autonomy and independence is a temporarily stabilized result
or outcome of a network of relations of dependence and recursive interactions. It is not an
essentialist feature of the individual. When that stability starts to unravel due to critical illness
and imminent death, the people closest to you in your network should be the ones prepared
to accept some of the burden of care as the network reconfigures. We may reclaim cognition
from the cognitivists and appreciate emotions again as our principal embodied value system.
Because we have mammalian bodies and brains, we can explore the role of physical intimacy
and touch as an important mode of caring for the dying, also for those that are no longer
conscious. Thinking along these alternative lines would give access to an alternative set of
practices around dying and end-of-life care, redefining the roles of the dying patients, next of
kin, health-care professionals and treatment options that should be generously available.
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